Kahl’s Epistemic Architecture of Power advances a sophisticated account of authority by arguing that power is sustained not only through coercion, law, wealth or institutional hierarchy, but through the systematic organisation of what actors are permitted to know, interpret and contest. Its central proposition is that political and institutional domination operates through the capture of epistemic agency, whereby individuals or groups become dependent on authorised interpreters for the very frameworks through which reality is understood. The thesis identifies three modalities: representation, where delegates evolve into epistemic principals; alliance, where partners consolidate a mutually reinforcing interpretive order; and appeasement, where weaker actors internalise dominant frames to avoid exclusion or sanction. Across these modalities, Kahl isolates four mechanisms—delegated interpretation, narrative consolidation, information gatekeeping and epistemic socialisation—which progressively narrow contestability and normalise dependency. A case synthesis emerges in the comparison between democratic representation and corporate governance: in both, constituents or shareholders may formally retain rights of oversight, yet their evaluative capacity is weakened when representatives monopolise data, language and interpretive standards. The argument’s normative force lies in treating epistemic agency as a public good, thereby imposing fiduciary-epistemic duties on those who control interpretive infrastructures. Ultimately, Kahl reframes justice itself as inseparable from knowledge governance: institutions are legitimate only where they protect plural interpretation, preserve dissent, and prevent authority from becoming an oligarchy over reality.
